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no access until a peribd"prior to the birth of the child which is too
short for the person to have been the father according to the laws of
nature. The Holder case follows the modern trend which fixes this period
somewhere between 190 and 216 days prior to the birth of the child. This
seems to be stretching the laws of nature beyond a natural point since
the average period of conception is 270 days; however, the motivating
forces of public policy and the long historic strength of the presumption
favoring the legitimacy of children seem sufficient justification.
EVIDENCE-JUROR OBTAINING INFORMATION ON "ARCING" BY READING BOOK ON ELECTRICITY DURING
TRIAL HELD REVERSIBLE ERROR
The decedent suffered death by electrocution while installing an outdoor television antenna. The plaintiff (the decedent's wife) brought the
action against the defendant corporation, alleging its highwire, which
passed through the decedent's yard, was the cause of death. Although the
plaintiff introduced evidence which tended to prove that the defendant
had not maintained the highwire the required distance above the ground
as specified by the Kansas statute, she did not introduce evidence showing
exactly how this highwire resulted in her husband's death. While the
jury was recessed, Noll, one of its members, read a book on electricity
and, when the jury reconvened, reported his findings concerning the
arcing and jumping characteristics of electricity.' The majority of the
jury admitted hearing Noll's statements, but only a few admitted to giving
them any consideration. Upon discovering Noll's statements, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. The Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed and remanded the cause because of jury misconduct.
Thomas v. Kansas Po'wer & Light Co., 340 P.2d 379 (Kan., 1959).
The court, in reversing, accepted the plaintiff's admission that the
juror was guilty of misconduct as conclusive, but stated that it would
have found the same result even if no such admission had been made.
As a result of this finding, the court gave a very cursory explanation as
to why the juror's statement would constitute jury misconduct. Although
not specifically stated, the issue of the case was whether arcing is a
matter of common knowledge.
At early common law, it was permissible for a member of the jury
to have personal knowledge of the case and, in fact, a juror was chosen
because he was possessed of this personal knowledge. 2 This rule had
such a wide scope that the jury could return a verdict notwithstanding

I Although arcing has a strict technical
gift
,na is referred to in some cases as the
jumping characteristic of electr'ie<-ffIe latter meaning will be used in this note.
37 3 4
2 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 3, pp.
, (1768).
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the fact that no evidence had been introduced concerning the issues of
the dispute. Today, however, the exact opposite prevails in the courts of
the United States and a juror may consider only that knowledge which
he has acquired by the introduction of evidence.8 The reason for this
procedure is that today's concept of fair play requires that all parties to
an action be given a fair opportunity to rebut any evidence which might
be damaging to their position.4 Obviously, this would be quite impossible
where a juror has imparted knowledge to his fellow jurors in the secrecy
of the jury room.
As is true with most rules, it is subject to qualification. The exception
may be stated as follows: The jury may arrive at a conclusion concerning
those matters which have not been introduced in evidence but which
relate to the issues where the fact propounded by the juror is a matter of
common knowledge. The exception is succinctly summed up by the court
in the case of Harrisv. Pounds:5
[A jury may take] into consideration all that knowledge which is common to
the average man and springs from the ordinary relations and experiences of life,
and in their adjudication may use and apply their own knowledge and observation as regards such ordinary experience and relations .... 6
From the above concepts, it logically follows that a juror's misconduct
flows not from the manner in which he acquired the knowledge, but from
whether that knowledge is common to a few as opposed to the multitudes.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to determine whether a
matter is, or is not, a matter of common knowledge. The lawyer's task
in this area is difficult because of the scarcity of cases in which the court
has decided what the jury may, and may not, conclude without the introduction of evidence. Further, this is a matter upon which the court passes
judgment and its ruling will be reversed only in cases where the judge
has blatantly overstepped his judicial discretion.7
In relation to the few decisions on this point, there is, perhaps, another
area to which the lawyer may resort in finding precedents-judicial
3 Klein v. Wilson, 167 Neb. 779, 94 N.W.2d 672 (1959); State v. Drainage District
No. 25, 280 S.W.2d 683 (Mo., 1955); Scherz v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation
Dist., 151 Neb. 415, 37 N.AV.2d 721 (1949); Rothstein v. Monette, 17 N.Y.S.2d 369
(1940).
4 Scherz v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 151 Neb. 415, 37 N.W.2d
721 (1949).
5 185 Miss. 688, 187 So. 891 (1939).
6.Ibid., at 893. Accord: Gettloeb v. Melrose Health Baths, 148 Cal. App. 313, 306 P.2d
568 (1957); State v. Drainage District No. 25, 280 S.W.2d 683 (Mo., 1955); Gange v.
Gange, 79 N.D. 372, 56 N.W.2d 688 (1953).
7 Scherz v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 151 Neb. 415, 37 N.W.2d
721 (1949).
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notice. In this area, one's attention is directed toward a judge's right to
judically notice facts as opposed to laws. 9 This above-mentioned hypothesis is posed by a number of cases which hold that the jury's knowledge
is, at best, no broader than the knowledge of a judge who sits upon the
bench. 10
It is a well established principle that a judge may take judicial knowledge of those facts which are notorious and a matter of common knowledge.1' This matter of common knowledge extends into all fields of
knowledge, e.g., geography, science, history and politics are examples,
but these technical fields are limited to theories or facts which are of
general knowledge to the public at large as opposed to the members of
these fields. This rule can best be explained by a discussion of scientific
facts-an area with which this note ultimately is concerned.
The general rule pertaining to scientific facts is that the court may
take judicial notice only of those scientific facts which are generally or
universally known and so generally understood as to form a part of the
common knowledge of every man. 1 This rule may be illustrated by the
following cases in which the court has taken judicial notice of a scientific
fact: (1) expansion and contraction of metals in heat and cold;"a (2) a
black surface will reflect substantially less light than a light surface, 14 and
(3) for every action there is a compensating reaction and the action and
15
reaction equalize.
Specifically, it has been established that courts will judicially notice
the nature and properties of electricity. 16 This precedent flows from the
more general rule that courts will take judicial notice of the elementary
natural laws of general application and the characteristics of scientifically
8 This is a theory adopted in the apparent absence of cases which specifically state
that the areas of judicial common knowledge and juror common knowledge are the
same.
9 Strain v. Isaacs, 135 Ohio St. 495,18 N.E.2d 816 (1938).

10 Harris v. Pounds, 185 Miss. 688, 187 So. 891 (1939); cf. Shelly v. Chilton, 236 Ky.
221, 32 S.W.2d 974 (1930); Tullgren v. Karger, 173 Wis. 288, 181 N.W. 232 (1921).
11 Elder v. Delcur, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Zinc v. Basham, 164 Kan. 456,
190 P.2d 203 (1948); Alabama Power v. Hensoff, 238 Ala. 348, 191 So. 379 (1939).
12 Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956); State v. Williams, 245
Iowa 401, 62 N.W.2d 241 (1954); Roberts v. Wofford Beach Hotel, 67 So.2d 670 (Fla.,
1953). Contra: Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351 (1949).

18 Fla. Amer. Dist. Electric Protective Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 139 Fla. 451,
190 So. 820 (1939).
14Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941).
15 Leavitt v. Bacon, 89 N.H. 383, 200 Ad. 399 (1938).
16Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lawley, 33 Ga.App. 375, 126 S.E. 273 (1925);
Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N.E. 849 (1891). Accord: Lothrop Theatres
v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 290 Mass. 189, 195 N.E. 305 (1935).
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established general properties of material substances and forces." However, courts will not take judicial notice of highly technical properties of
electricity 18 and, in relation to this, one can only guess what the courts
will term as being highly technical.
There are very few cases which even mention arcing and, in relation
to these cases, it must be remembered that, as the general knowledge of
the public increases, there will be a corresponding increase in matters
over which a court may take judicial cognizance.
In Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lawley, 19 the trial court refused to judicially
notice that electricity would not arc a distance of two feet from a high
wire maintained by the defendant company to a metal tape held by the
decedent. From this, it can be fairly implied that a court would not
judicially notice that electricity would jump two feet.
That the court's view does change from time to time with an increase
of knowledge is pointed out by the case of Pascal v. Southern Cal. Edison.2 0 It was held that the arcing propensity of electricity is a wellknown physical fact of which all capable workmen are deemed to have
common knowledge. This case implied that arcing is not a matter of
general knowledge and, therefore, a jury may not apply it to issues of
a case without the introduction of evidence.
The Pascal case indicates the beginning of a trend toward the judicial
recognition of arcing; this trend is braked by the Thomas case, which
holds arcing not to be a matter of common knowledge. However, the
Thomas case does not completely extinguish this apparent trend. In the
Thomas dissent, written by Justice Wertz, and concurred in by two
other justices, it is stated that arcing or jumping is a fact of common
knowledge. It appears that their primary basis for arriving at this conclusion is that the defendant, in his brief, states that a ten year old boy
knows it is dangerous to come into close proximity with an electrically
charged wire. It is reasoned that, since the only danger in coming into
close proximity with an electrically charged wire is that the electricity
might jump or arc to a metal object on the person, a ten year old boy
must know of the arcing or jumping characteristic of electricity. It obviously follows that since a ten year boy knows of arcing, it must be a
matter of common knowledge.
What little case law there is concerning the arcing property of electricity indicates that it is not regarded as a matter of common knowledge
but that there is some pressure among the judiciary to recognize it as such.
17 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lawley, 33 Ga. App. 375, 126 S.E. 273 (1925).
18 Ibid.

19 33 Ga. App. 375, 126 S.E. 273 (1925).
20 102 Cal. App. 254, 227 P.2d 555 (1951).

